In case any of the federal agents reading were unfamiliar with the term “dry run,” DHS/FBI offered this definition:
“Unlike preoperational surveillance — which can occur months or even years before the attack — a dry run is similar to a dress rehearsal and usually indicates that an attack is imminent.”
The actor James Woods witnessed a dry run, on an American Airlines cross-country flight, in August of 2001. That dry run was conducted by Mohammad Atta and three of his men. During that flight, Woods informed the American Airlines captain that Atta and his men were behaving like they might hijack that plane; the captain informed the FAA what Woods told him but nothing was done because that was before 9/11. (Federal officials have known about dry runs since at least 1994.) And so the Woods dry run story ends in great tragedy.
Things have changed. At least they could change. The DHS/FBI joint security assessment explains how things could change and why they should change:
“Law enforcement and homeland security personnel should be aware that every practice run provides an opportunity for officers to detect terrorist operational planning. Increased awareness of suspicious incidents that are similar and bear the marks of operational planning could be key in detecting the next attack.”
Increased awareness, DHS/FBI analysts state in no uncertain terms, is the “key in detecting the next attack.” So my question is this: why have I received so many emails from US Federal Air Marshals letting me know they learned about the recent dry run/probe on American Airlines flight 62 [sic] — from an article I wrote last week for The Aviation Nation, and not from DHS or the FBI?
The incident, one in which a group of Middle Eastern men attempted to breach the cockpit of an American Airlines, Paris-to-Miami flight, came to me from a trusted source in the field. American Airlines spokesman John Hotard confirmed the incident. Hotard would not comment on the FBI’ s investigation of the incident citing “security reasons.” Here’s a portion of what happened on the flight, as told by an American Airlines captain:
“Mid-Atlantic, the FO [First Officer, or Co-Pilot] called to return to the cockpit after his crew-rest break. One of the perps [perpetrators] was in the forward galley, was instructed by a FA to go aft, but didn’t.As the cockpit door opened, another perp suddenly appeared from around the galley, dropped his shoulder into FO while the first one got in the way of the FO’s attempt to block the other…if not an attempt on the cockpit, this was a serious probe.“
After the article published, I received an email from Gary Boettcher, president of The Coalition of Airline Pilots Association, one of the largest pilot associations in the world (including the members of American Airlines Pilots’ Union, APA). Here’s what Boettcher said:
“Hi Annie,
Saw your article on the AA [American Airlines] probing incident. Thought you might like to know the actual flt number was AA 63, CDG [Charles De Gaulle] to MIA [Miami]. Flt 62 goes from MIA [Miami] to CDG [Charles De Gaulle].
Even though the author made a mistake, the incident described was pretty accurate.
Still working the Hill on aviation security issues.
Best regards,
Gary
Boettcher’s email makes a few things perfectly clear: pilots know about — and watch for — dry runs and probes, and so do flight crews. Pilots tell other pilots about these dry runs and probes because they want to have an increased awareness of the fact that dry runs and probes “bear the marks of operational planning and can be key in detecting the next attack.” Pilots support the release of this information to the flying public because they are not afraid to face the facts: Islamic fundamentalists continue to target passenger airplanes.
But one question — a key question — remains: Why are Homeland Security officials loathe to share this kind of critical information with their own federal agents? What good is a DHS/FBI “Joint Homeland Security Assessment” if information about a dry run, after one actually happens, is not immediately disseminated among all federal agents, including Federal Air Marshals?
The recent dry run or probe on American Airlines flight 63 occurred on a flight that has already been saved once from a terrorist attack by the heroics of flight crew and passengers. If you recall, it was American Airlines flight 63 that “shoe bomber” Richard Reid tried to take down with explosives hidden in his shoes, in December of 2001.
To support CAPA President Gary Boettcher’s efforts on the Hill, Click Here.
